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Presidential Election
Maxensius Tri Sambodoa,
a Indonesian

Institute of Sciences (LIPI)

Abstract
This paper aims to assess the role of middle class in Indonesia’s democracy, with the particular focus of
the last Indonesian Presidential election. This study uses econometric analyses to assess preferences of
middle class in presidential election by exploring data at district/city and provincial. The main finding in this
study strongly suggests that religious and personality are still important elements under the race of Indonesia
president. This study also found that different group of middle class has different attitudes in selecting the
presidential candidate and the upper group of middle class is more likely to select Joko Widodo. Finally, a
fragile middle class and a relatively high number of abstainers could be a barrier toward more substantive
democracy.
Keywords: Middle Class; Democracy; Presidential Election; Indonesia

Abstrak
Makalah ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis peran kelompok kelas menengah dalam proses demokrasi di
Indonesia, secara khusus peran mereka difokuskan pada hasil pemilihan presiden yang terakhir. Studi
ini menggunakan pendekatan ekonometrik untuk mengalisis preferensi kelompok kelas menengah dalam
memilih calon presiden, dengan melakukan eksplorasi data pada tingkat kabupaten/kota dan provinsi. Hasil
studi menunjukkan, agama dan personalitas calon presiden menjadi faktor penting dalam pertarungan
pemilihan presiden. Studi ini juga menunjukkan, berbagai kelompok dalam kelas menengah memiliki
preferensi yang berbeda dalam memilih kandidat presiden dan kelompok kelas menengah atas cenderung
memilih Joko Widodo. Akhirnya, kelas menengah yang rentan dan tingginya kelompok yang abstain, akan
menjadi hambatan untuk menuju demokrasi yang lebih substantif.
Kata kunci: Kelas Menengah; Demokrasi; Pemilihan Presiden; Indonesia
JEL classifications: A12, C33

1. Introduction
Sumner & Edward (2014), argued that Indonesia
could become a high income country by 2030 with
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (Atlas
method) would across US$12,000 between 2025
and 20301 . Rising income per capita will elevate the
 Researcher at Economic Research Center - Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).
Correspondence address: 4th & 5th Floor, Widya Graha BuildingLIPI. Jl Gatot Subroto Kav. 10. Jakarta Selatan 12710, Indonesia.
E-mail: maxensius.tri.sambodo@lipi.go.id; smaxensius@
yahoo.com.
1 This is very optimistic scenario with economic growth at
6.7% per year; atlas method means that it is adjusted for fluctua-

number of middle class (people earning or spending
US$10–US$100 a day – 2005 purchasing power
parity) from about 18.1% of population or 45.7 million in 2013 to about 41.4% or 121.4 million in 2030
(Figure 1). It is also believed that Indonesia’s middle
class (another terminology such as new consumer
class2 ) is as driver of economic growth. However,
this level of welfare cannot be achieved if the nature
tion in prices and exchange rate.
2 In the Mckinsey Global Institute (MGI) (2012) used consumer class. Consuming class defined as individuals with an
annual net income of above US$3,600 at 2005 purchasing power
parity (PPP). Under the 5–6% annual GDP growth, in 2030 the
consuming class will increase from 45 million in 2010 to about
135 million in 2030, but with 7% GDP growth, the consumer
class will reach 170 million in 2030 (MGI 2012).
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of economic development are characterized by jobless growth, declining competitiveness, and rising
inequality (Harvard Kennedy School 2013).
The sustainable growth of strong middle class has
become of one economic development agenda
(Asian Development Bank/ADB 2010). Promoting
this group is believed can bring more domestic oriented economic growth and broad base economic
growth. This can help the country to obtain the national resilient. Economists also believed that promoting the middle class will not disturb or hurt the
poor, even it can create more stable and efficient
poverty reduction and economic development (ADB
2010).
Pursuing market economy has become the underlying rapid growth of middle class. Market economy has been linked to political transition from authoritarian government to democracy. In terms of
market economy and democracy indicator, Indonesia is categorized as functional flaws and defective
democracy3 . Over the 129 countries, Indonesia was
ranked 45 for the market economy status (at the
ASEAN level, Indonesia was the fifth rank after Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines) and
38 for democracy status (the highest rank among
ASEAN countries). Further, as seen from Figure
2, in terms GDP per capita, Indonesia ranked 66
(over 115 countries) or among the ASEAN countries, Indonesia was ranked fourth after Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand. This implies that although
the democracy status in Indonesia is much higher
than other ASEAN countries, the level of GDP per
capita was lower than countries with lower status of
democracy.
Boediono (2008) said that the level of economic
development is one of key determinants for sustainability of democracy. He argued that the level
of income per capita determines the lifespan of
democracy. At US$6,000 income per capita and
above (Purchasing Power Parity, based 2001) or at
US$6,600 income per capita and above (Purchasing Power Parity, based 2006), democracy can stay
much longer and the probability of its failure is very
low (1/500). However, the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency or BIN mentioned that to bring Indonesia to full democracy, Indonesia needs welfare
3 Freedom House pointed out that Indonesia’s score
was 3 (partly democracy), it was similar with year
2014. (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/
2015/indonesia).
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stability and Indonesia needs to achieve US$6,000
income per capita (Hikam 2014). Thus, it seems
that there is a level of income per capita that is necessary to achieve for stable democracy. Currently,
Indonesia GDP per capita, PPP was US$4,955.9
that was still lower than the level for stable democracy.
While in terms of GDP, Indonesia may need longer
term to reach stable democracy, the victory of Joko
Widodo over Probowo in the 2014 presidential, under the peaceful election process has bring new
hope for the future of democracy in Indonesia. According to Aspinall & Mietzner (2014), the choice
between Joko Widodo dan Prabowo Subianto are
represented two options: (i) maintaining the existing democratic polity (this refer to Joko Widodo);
and (ii) pursuing a populist experimentation and
neo-authoritarian regression (this refer to Prabowo
Subianto). Further, one of reputable election surveys such as Indikator Politik Indonesia (2014) conducted the exit pool survey, on the day of the presidential election on 9 July 2014. The survey indicated that the two presidential candidates shared
different supporting voters4 . Prabowo Subianto’s
voters were more likely in urban area and university graduate. They also have higher income than
Jokowi’s voters. This implies that Prabowo’s voters
is more likely to share a middle class characteristics
than the Jokowi’s voters. Thus, it may be right when
Ünaldi et al. (2014, p. 7) said that it is too soon
to write off the Asian middle classes as agents of
political change.
By considering both economic and political dimension of presidential election, this paper aims to
address two main questions. First, can the existence of middle class explain the victory of Joko
Widodo? Second, can Indonesia Democracy Index
(IDI) explain the victory of Joko Widodo? The two
questions are interrelated. According to Boediono
(2008), there are two types of middle class with
respect to democracy orientation. First is a consumer middle class with formal democracy orientation. This group may not have commitment to guard
democracy. Especially if this group grows from corruption, collusion and nepotism environment. The
4 Indikator Politik Indonesia conducted an exit pool survey on
9 July 2014. There were selected randomly and proportionally
2,000 polling stations (TPS) in all provinces. The respondents
were randomly assign between 7.00–9.00 am. The total number
of respondents who were interviewed 1,904 people (95.2%), the
margin of error was 2.2% at 95% confidence level.
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Figure 1: Middle Class in Indonesia
Note: Middle Class variables estimate and provide forecasts of the number of people living in households earning or spending between
10 USD and 100 USD per person per day (2005 PPP USD), and the consumption expenditure of this group; Headcount ratio, which
measures the percent of the population in the middle class; up dated August 2013
Source: Kaufmann, Kharas and Penciakova (2012)

Figure 2: Market Economy and Democracy Index 2014 (Third Indicator GDP Per Capita, PPP)
Note: the red circle indicates Indonesia; the size of circle indicates population size; 7438 indicates 39 defective democracies show an
average GDP per capita of US$7,438; 4357 indicates 14 highly defective democracies show an average GDP per capita of US$4,537;
Indonesia GDP per capita, PPP was US$4,955.9
Source: http://www.bti-project.org/bti-home/ (Accessed 17 February 2015)
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middle class group who nurture under this condition can create a high economic growth but it is
not sustainable because it is lack in strengthening
democracy, good governance, and law certainty.
This group of middle class create a rent seeker or
ersatz capitalism. The second group is a ’true middle class’. This group of middle class is driven by
fair competition environment. This group of middle
class aims to pursue the essence or substantive
democracy rather than a formal mechanism democracy.
We applied two different methods to assess the
connection between middle class, democracy, and
presidential election. First, we utilised the presidential election results from the district level, and
combined it with the expenditure by decile of households. Second, we used the Indonesia Democracy
Index at provincial level and corresponded it with
the presidential election data. We organised the paper into five sections. After introduction we explored
the characteristic of Indonesia’s middle class with
comparison to other ASEAN countries. In section
three, we brought a literature review in understanding between middle class and democracy. Section
four described the methodology from the three approaches. Section five provided empirical results
and analysis. Finally section six consisted of conclusions and policy implications.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Middle Class in Indonesia

D EMOCRACY: A N A SSESSMENT...

As seen from Table 1, the size of middle in the
ASEAN countries are varies, and Malaysia and
Thailand has the biggest size of middle class. Indonesia with the highest number of population, the
size of middle class was about 46.6% of population.
Most of Indonesia middle class is lower middle and
the size of upper middle was about 2.55 million that
was lower than Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines.
The table also indicates that Thailand had the big
size of ’supper’ middle class (above US$20).
Table 2 shows the size of middle class in Indonesia
between 1999 and 2009 both in urban and rural
area. Between 1999 and 2009, the size of middle class increased from 25% to 43%. The size of
middle class increased both in the rural and urban
area, but the size of middle class in urban area
was double size compare to rural area. Further, by
comparing the size gap between 1999 and 2009,
we conclude that the size of urban middle class
grew faster than the in the rural area. Although, the
largest increase of lower-middle class was in rural,
the vertical mobility to the higher class was mostly
happened in urban area. This indicates that urban
area can provide more opportunity to graduate to
the upper level than in rural area.
Thus, we can conclude that middle class in Indonesia has low size in relative terms compare to other
ASEAN countries, even for the upper middle class,
the absolute number is lower than Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines. Then, we also observed that
middle class is an urban phenomenon, but there
is a rising of lower middle class in the rural area.
Finally, with the size middle of class under the lower
middle category, the Indonesia middle class is more
vulnerable to economic shocks.

ADB (2010) said that more than a half of Asia’s population were considered part of middle class, but
the majority was classified lower middle class (consuming US$2–US$4 per person per day)5 . Thus,
at that level they are highly vulnerable to slipping
back into poverty due to economic shocks (ADB
2010). For example, the survey before and after the
1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia, indicated that the number of middle class individuals
(US$2–US$20 per day) fell by 4.8 million or roughly
10% of the middle class population (ADB 2010).

The growing middle class is paralleled by increasing expenditure inequality (gini ratio6 ) and declining
in the percentage of poor people (Figure 3). Economic crisis in 1997/98 increased the percentage
of poor people, but the crisis reduced gini ratio in
1999. This implies that the non-poor group was
hardest hit by the crisis compared to the poor group.
Study indicated that increasing income inequality
has a negative and statistically significant impact on
medium-term economic growth7 . There are three

5 ADB (2010) divided the middle class into three groups: (i)
the lower-middle class-consuming US$2–US$4 per person per
day; (ii) the middle-middle class at US$4–US$10 per person per
day; and (iii) the upper middle class US$10–US$20 per person
per day.

6 Gini ratio is a measurement of income inequality. The index
has a value between 0 and 1. 0 indicates perfect equality and
1 indicates perfect inequality. In the case of Indonesia, BPS
measures Gini ratio based on expenditure data.
7 ’Focus on Inequality and Growth’, OECD Decem-
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Table 1: Size of Middle Class (Base on Household Survey Means, in 2005 PPP$)
Country
Malaysia
Thailand
Philippines
Viet Nam
Indonesia
Cambodia
Lao PDR

Survey Year

$2–$4

2004
2004
2006
2006
2005
2004
2002

27.05
33.50
31.49
35.53
34.96
24.7
19.6

% of population
$4–$10
$10–$20
48.10
41.69
19.65
14.81
10.46
7.41
3.88

14.13
10.63
3.80
1.93
1.16
0.91
0.41

Total

$20+

$2–$4

89.28
85.82
54.94
52.27
46.58
33.04
23.89

3.44
3.46
0.70
0.15
0.26
0.33
0.02

6.81
21.87
27.43
29.89
77.10
3.39
1.10

Total population (million)
$4–$10
$10–$20
Total
12.12
27.21
17.11
12.46
23.07
1.02
0.22

3.56
6.94
3.31
1.62
2.55
0.12
0.02

22.49
56.02
47.85
43.97
102.72
4.53
1.34

$20+
0.87
2.26
0.61
0.13
0.58
0.05
0.00

Source: ADB (2010)

Table 2: Population Distribution (%) by Expenditure per Person per Day (2005 $ PPP) in Indonesia)
Per Capita Expenditure

National
1999
2009

Urban
1999
2009

Rural
1999
2009

<$1.25
$1.25–$2
$2-$4
$4–$6
$6–$10
$10–$20
>$20

42.2
32.8
20.1
3.5
1.2
0.3
0.0

24.6
32.4
30.9
7.5
3.3
1.1
0.2

23.4
32.4
33.0
7.6
2.8
0.6
0.1

12.2
25.5
40
13.2
6.5
2.2
0.3

53.5
32.9
12.4
0.9
0.2
0.0
0.0

33.7
37.5
24.3
3.3
0.9
0.3
0.1

Total
$2-$20

100
25

100
42.7

100
44

100
62

100
13.6

100
28.7

Source: ADB (2010)

channels to understand the connection8 : (i) undermines educational opportunity for disadvantaged
individuals; (ii) lowering social mobility; and (iii) hampering skills development.
As seen from Table 3, between 2006 and 2010, the
share of the lowest 40% of expenditure group both
in rural and urban was about 17%9 . This indicates
the low level of inequality. In rural area, the expenditure distribution has low inequality for the whole
years, while in urban area, between 2011 and 2014,
the expenditure distribution became moderately inequality. In contrast, at the national level, between
2011 and 2013, the distribution of expenditure was
moderate inequality, but it reached low inequality in
2014.
During the period 2006 and 2011, the share of 20%
upper expenditure group, increased rapidly both in
ber 2014, Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs - Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and
Development.
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/

urban and rural area (Table 3). Then the share is
relatively stable after that year. This indicates that
the 20% upper expenditure group is fairly stable especially in urban area. However, the upper 20% in
rural area, declined while the 40 bottom and middle
tend to grow. The result similar with BPS (2014a)
that indicated between 2011 and 2014, the expenditure inequality (Gini ratio) in urban area increased
while in rural area it tends to decline. The Theil index
that showed expenditure inequality among the rich
showed that between 2011 and 2014, it declined
(BPS 2014a). This indicates that currently, expenditure inequality among the rich became smaller. In
contrast, the L-index that measure inequality among
the poor especially in the urban area, tends to increase (BPS 2014a). This indicates that expenditure inequality among the poor in urban area is
more serious than in rural area.
Growing middle class in Indonesia has been driven
by increasing availability of formal job10 . In 2007,
the share of formal job to the total available job

Focus-Inequality-and-Growth-2014.pdf
8 ibid

9 According

to the World Bank, the low inequality of the share
of the lowest 40% is above 17%; middle inequality if it is between
12%–17%; and high inequality if it is less than 12%.

10 There are two category of jobs, formal and informal job. According to BPS, formal job refers to employee and employer
assisted by permanent workers; while informal job covers: (i)
own account workers; (ii) employer assisted by temporary work-
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Figure 3: Percentage of Poor People and Gini Ratio in Indonesia 1996–2013
Source: Calculated from BPS (2014a)

Table 3: Distribution of Expenditure Based on Expenditure Group
Expenditure group

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Urban
40% bottom
40% middle
20% upper

19.79
36.90
43.33

19.08
37.13
43.80

18.55
37.00
44.45

18.50
36.58
44.92

17.57
36.99
45.44

16.10
34.77
49.13

16.00
35.53
49.48

15.40
34.83
49.77

15.62
34.88
49.50

Rural
40% bottom
40% middle
20% upper

23.42
39.04
37.53

22.00
37.94
40.05

22.06
38.58
39.36

22.45
38.45
39.11

20.98
38.78
40.24

19.97
37.47
42.55

20.60
37.57
41.82

21.03
37.96
41.00

20.94
38.40
40.65

Urban & rural
40% bottom
40% middle
20% upper

21.42
37.65
41.26

18.74
36.51
44.75

18.72
36.43
44.86

18.96
36.14
44.90

18.05
36.48
45.47

16.86
34.73
48.41

16.98
34.41
48.61

16.87
34.09
49.04

17.12
34.60
48.28

Source: BPS (2014a)
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was about 31%, and in 2014, it was about 41%11 .
Although almost 60% of employee works in the informal sector, with better social security program that
employee in informal sector can have better access
on health, education, and other insurances. Further, Nazara (2010) proposed to protect worker’s
families in informal sector, government needs to
create flexibility in the labour market with providing
better social protection to the workers and his/her
families. Second, government needs to redesign
industrialisation strategy for creating more job opportunity while government also needs to pursue
macroeconomic stability, political stability, and law
certainty.

2.2. Middle Class and Democracy
There are many studies that attempted to link between economy and democracy. Lipset (1959) argued that there is a strong and positive correlation
between income per capita and democracy in a
global cross section nations. Similarly Barro (1999,
p. 160) said that "Increases in various measures
of the standard of living forecast a gradual rise in
democracy. In contrast, democracies that arise without prior economic development ... tend not to last."
Acemoglu et al. (2008) found that they were failed
to find causal effect between income and democracy, although income and democracy are positively
correlated. Further, by collecting data from 104
countries from period 1970–2007, Fayad, Bates
and Hoeffler (2012) model could not show direct
causality from income causes democracy and vice
versa. However, Fayad, Bates and Hoeffler (2012,
p. 17) pointed out that "countries that receive little or no income from resources the relationship
between democracy and income is positive and significant." Thus countries that do not have problem
with "rentier state" and "resource curse" will be able
to achieve better democracy12 .

ers/unpaid worker; (iii) casual worker in agriculture; (iv) casual
worker not in agriculture; and (v) unpaid worker.
11 It is author’s calculation from Penduduk 15 Tahun Ke Atas
Menurut Status Pekerjaan Utama 1986–2015, BPS. http://
www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/971.
12 According to Ross (2001), "rentier state" indicates that government with huge revenue from natural resource (such as oil)
aims to pursue low tax and high levels spending on public policy.
This can reduce level of political discontent. Similarly, government will also spend more money to support internal security.
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The debate between economy and democracy
come from two major sources. First, the methodological issue has not been settled. Acemoglu et
al. (2008) pointed two issues13 : (1) there is possibility for reserve causality and perhaps democracy
causes income rather than the other way round; and
(2) there is the potential for omitting variable bias.
Second, the attitude of middle class toward democracy is in challenge. There is internal diversity in
middle class group toward the political change.
The role of middle class for democracy has been divided into two arguments (Ünaldi et al. 2014). First,
a conservative middle class can prevent democratization from happening by capitalizing their number
and political clout. Second, middle class can bring
about political liberalization. Boediono (2008) emphasizes on the important of quality of middle class.
Beodiono (2008, p. 6) also argued that economic
growth can create good quality of middle class if it
can fulfil two conditions: (i) economic growth needs
to be broad based; (ii) it is driven by human resources due to productivity, creative thinking, ingenuity of people, instead of exploitation of natural
resources.
However, the Indonesian middle class tends to hesitant in expressing their political aspiration. The survey that was conducted by Saiful Muljani between
30 June and 3 July 2014, indicates that it is difficult to predict who will become the winner of this
election14 . Although Joko Widodo won about 2.7%
from the survey, it was about 7.5% of respondents
This can mitigate the formation of political organizations that
demand on more political rights. Similarly, Ross also argue that
growth that is driven by resource boom will lead democracy fall
if the benefits cannot boost the level of higher education and
occupational specialization.
13 Then to measure the problems, Acemoglu et al. (2008) applied two strategies of estimation. First, it is necessary to control
for country-specific factors affecting both income and democracy
by including country fixed effects. Thus, the fixed effect adopts
interpretation from Lipset (1959) that said individual countries
should become more democratic if they are richer, not simply
that rich countries should be democratic. Alternatively, Acemoglu
et al. (2008) said that the fixed effect allow us to interpret that
countries is more likely to become (relatively) democratic as it becomes (relatively) richer. In the second strategy, Acemoglu et al.
(2008) used instrumental variables (IV) regressions to estimate
the impact of income on democracy. They experimented with
two potential instruments: (i) past saving rates and (ii) changes
in the incomes of trading partners. They argued that variations in
the past savings rates affect income per capita but should have
no direct impact on democracy.
14 Survei Nasional Pemilihan Presiden–Wakil Presiden,
30 Juni–3 Juli 2014. Saiful Mujani Research and Con-
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has not decided to whom they will vote. If all the
undecided voters choose Prabowo, then Prabowo
will become the 7th Indonesia President. Further,
the survey also indicates that even for 14% of respondents who have their owned candidate, they
were still uncertain. Thus the day between 4 and 9
July 2014, will be a critical time for both of candidate
to gain voters.
Then, a Saiful Muljani’s survey also indicates that
the trend of Prabowo’s electability also increased
from 33.2% in April 2014 to about 44.9% in 3rd
July 2014, while the electability of Joko Widodo
declined from 50.8% to about 47.6 for the same
period of time15 . However, due to a marginal
decrease electability level, Aspinal and Mietzner
(2014) said that Joko Widodo could build on a much
stronger support base of loyal, long term voters
than Prabowo. Ünaldi et al. (2014) argued that it is
needed for greater solidarity and democratic governance to convince the "Tyranny of the Old Middle".
However, the political participation on in 2014 presidential election was lower than the legislative election. The participation rate during the legislative
election was 75.1% (BPS 2014b). As seen from Table 4, during the presidential election, about 30.4%
number of voters did not use their rights in the presidential election (golput). The number is vary across
the region. At the national level, Sumatera region
has the highest of golput while Papua region has
the lowest rate. The percentage of golput in foreign
pool is very substantial or about 66%. Further, it is
not necessary when voter used their right, it can
be valid. Table 10 indicates that more than 1.3 million or 1% of voter that use their right cannot be
counted due to various reasons. The large number of golput caused inefficiency in election funds.
If KPU said that the approximate cost for logistics
(voter paper, ink, filling form, and vote template)
was about Rp46.7 billion16 and with total number of
voters about 194 million, thus the logistic cost for
one vote was approximately Rp241. Thus, if we consider voters that do not use their right or use their
right with the wrong ways, the total cost was about
Rp14.5 billion or it was about 31% from the total
sulting (SMRC). http://www.slideshare.net/joaquimrohi/
surnas-pilpres-juli-2014.
15 ibid
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logistic cost17 . We may argue that high inefficiency
due to high number of golput and people that do
not use their right properly, is the cost of democracy.
In the future, it is important to reduce the efficiency
because the money can be reallocated for other
purposes that can benefit people. By making good
planning and improving people awareness to use
their political vote properly, inefficiency in election
budget can be minimized. Thus, although the demand on democratic polity is strong, but it is still not
strong enough (declining voters turnout).

3. Method
3.1. Unit of Analysis
Due to data availability problem, we divided the
method to assess the relationship between middle class, democracy and presidential election into
two parts. In the first part, we focus on the data at
the district level. We investigated the middle class
and their political behaviour toward the presidential election. We define middle class as a group
of households with monthly expenditure above the
40% decile. We select 40% as a cut point because
anti-poverty program is designed for household below the 40% decile. The group of household below
40% decile is classified as poor and near poor family. This group of family has right to obtain social
assistance programmes such as social assistance
card, family welfare cards, family welfare depostis,
rice for the poor (Raskin), family hope program,
cash transfers for poor students/smart Indonesia
card, premium assistance beneficiaries form National Health Insurance/Health Indonesia Card. This
implies that families above 40% decile have independent choice on their own consumption, social
assistance, and economic activity. This group of
family is also relatively comparable with lowest cut
point that was proposed by ADB (consuming US$2
per person per day)18 .
Because we focus on Jokowi’s victory as the dependent variable, we apply a binary outcomes tech17 We

calculate Rp241 x 60.3 million of voters
(2010) divided the middle class into three groups: (i)
the lower-middle class-consuming US$2–US$4 per person per
day; (ii) the middle-middle class at US$4–US$10 per person per
day; and (iii) the upper middle class US$10–US$20 per person
per day.
18 ADB

16 Total Biaya Surat Suara Pilpres Rp24,2 Miliar, Kompas.com,
Rabu, 4 Juni 2014. http://nasional.kompas.com/read/

2014/06/04/2101093/Total.Biaya.Surat.Suara.Pilpres.
Rp.24.2.Miliar.
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Table 4: Presidential Election Result 2014
Number of
voters

Number of voters
that use their right

39,775,327
110,926,943
11,353,294
13,878,935
2,097,784
4,001,266
9,809,113
2,101,538
193,944,200

26,228,598
79,181,233
7,609,001
9,400,311
1,447,418
3,369,515
7,011,297
706,591
134,953,964

Region
Sumatera
Java
Kalimantan
Sulawesi
Maluku
Papua
Bali-NTB-NTT
Foreign pool
National

Number of voters
that use their right
Valid vote
In-valid vote
26,014,678
78,280,208
7,529,323
9,350,789
1,440,414
3,328,774
6,952,234
677,857
133,574,277

213,92
901,028
79,678
49,522
7,004
40,741
59,063
28,734
1,379,690

Number of voters that
do not use their rights
13,546,729 (34.1)
31,745,710 (28.6)
3,744,293 (33.0)
4,478,624 (32.3)
650,366 (31.0)
631,751 (15.8)
2,797,816 (28.5)
1,394,947 (66.4)
58,990,236 (30.4)

Note: number in italic indicates its share to total number of voters
Source: calculated from Hasil Penghitungan Perolehan Suara dari Setiap Provinsi dan Luar Negeri dalam Pemilu
Source: Presiden dan Wakil Presiden Tahun 2014: diisi berdasarkan Formulir Model DC PPWP dan Sertifikat
Source: Luar Negeri. http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/PPWP_-_Nasional_Rekapitulasi_2014_-_New_-_
Source: Final_2014_07_22.pdf, accessed 30 January 2015

nique. There are two types of binary outcomes
model that widely use the probit and the logit model.
Because the two models are similar and the parameter can easily be compared, for simplicity purpose,
we focus on probit model19 . The general expression
of probit model as follow:
P robrZi

ωi1 γ

 1s  P pωi , γ q  1 e eω γ
1

(1)

i

Let Zi denote outcome 1 if Joko Widodo won the
election and 0 if Joko Widodo lose the election.
As we describe before, in the first method we focus on district level and we have 497 district. With
this situation, we can be more flexible in selecting
independent variables, where for ωi we included
education, formal job, internet access, PDRB, and
expenditure group.
In the second part, we focused the analysis at the
provincial level. We used the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) and threat it as explanatory variable
for the president election. The initiative to prepare
Indonesia Democracy Index, has been prepared
since 2007. The National Development Planning
Board (Badan Perencana Pembangunan Nasional,
Bappenas) and UNDP has been involved since the
early stage of preparation20 . Both quantitative and
qualitative approaches has been used to measure
IDI. Quantitative approach includes newspaper and
19 To make the logit and probit slope estimates comparable,
we can multiply the logit estimate by 0.625 (Wooldridge 2002).
20 Four of panel experts involved in the early preparation of
IDI such as Professor Maswadi Rauf, Saiful Mujani, Abdul Malik
Gismar, and Syarif Hidayat.

documents (local regulations) coding, while qualitative approach covers focus group discussion and
in-depth interview. IDI has ranking between 0 and
100 (the higher the better for democracy). IDI has
three main components: (i) civil liberty; (ii) political rights; and (iii) institution of democracy. The
components are divided into several variables and
indicators. The IDI covers 28 indicators. The Central
Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik /BPS), collect data at provincial level, then it is proceed at the
national level. Expert panel and other stakeholders
such as Office of the Coordinating Political, Legal
and Security Affairs (KEMENKOPOLHUKAM) and
Minister of Home Affairs are verified the data and
information.

In the second method, we apply a formula as equation 1. Because, we only have 33 provinces, thus
we have limitation to select independent variable to
ensure we have enough degree of freedom. Thus in
the second, method, we selected Indonesia Democracy Index (IDI)21 and Human Development Index
(HDI) as independent variables22 .

21 The

average index between 2009 and 2013.
Indonesia HDI consist of four main components such as
life expectancy (years), literacy, average year in the school, and
purchasing power. Thus, by including the HDI, we can capture
both social and economic dimension.
22 In
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4. Results and Analysis
4.1. Statistic Descriptive Analysis for
the First Method
We collect the data for 497 district/city, and the summary of data can be seen in Table 5. As seen from
the table, Joko Widodo – M. Jusuf Kalla won in
329 district/city or it was about 66.2% of the total
district/city. The average regional domestic product
(PDRB) at district/city was about Rp4,6 trillion. The
lowest PDRB was in Tambrauw district, West Papua
Province while the highest PDRB was in Central
Jakarta, DKI Jakarta Province. The average number
of people with higher education degree was about
22,597, the lowest number was in Nduga district,
in Papua province and the highest number was in
East Jakarta, DKI Jakarta Province. On average,
about 13% of household had access on internet.
The highest share was in Banda Aceh city, Aceh
Province, while in Tambrauw district, there was no
internet access. On average, about 32.2% of employee had a formal job, the lowest share was in
Nduga and the highest share was in Batam city,
Kepulauan Riau Province. The average share of
expenditure on middle group was about 37%, the
lowest was in Asmat district, Papua Province, and
the highest percentage was in Intan Jaya district,
Papua Province. Finally the average of upper group
expenditure was about 43.3%, the lowest share
was in Nduga district, and the highest share was in
Asmat district.
Before proceed to further analysis, we investigate
linear correlation among variables (Table 6). If we
assume there is a linear relationship among variables, we obtained negative correlation between
the victory of Joko Widodo and characteristics of
middle class (except for upper-expenditure group)23 .
We observed that education has positive correlation with internet access, formal job, and upperexpenditure group. Then, there is also positive correlation between formal job and internet access. We
do not obtain strong correlation between middleexpenditure group and education, internet access
and formal job, even we had negative sign. In the
case of upper-expenditure group, we obtained positive correlation with education, internet access and
23 Our result is similar with the survey from the Indikator Politik
Indonesia (2014)

D EMOCRACY: A N A SSESSMENT...

formal job. There is negative and strong correlation
between middle-expenditure and upper-expenditure
group. This is because, the indicator is connected
one and another. As we mention before, the sum of
expenditure group is 100%, thus be a part of one
decile group means cancel out join other group.
A linear correlation does not mean causation. The
next step, we developed a regression model, to investigate the causality among the attribute of middle
class such as education, formal job, and internet access with the middle and upper expenditure group.
The model we presents as follows (where i represent for district/city):
expenditureei

β1 educationi

β2 formal_jobi

β3 internet_accessi

i

4.2. Statistic Descriptive Analysis for
the Second Method
As seen from Figure 4, Joko Widodo – M. Jusuf
Kalla won in 23 provinces. The five provinces
that dominated by Joko Widodo – M. Jusuf Kalla
were West Sulawesi, Papua, South Sulawesi, Bali,
and West Papua; while the five provinces that
Prabowo Subianto – Hatta Rajasa won substantially were West Sumatera, West Nusa Tenggara,
Gorontalo, West Java, and Banten. In the foreign
pool, Joko Widodo obtained higher number of vote
than Prabowo. In terms number of voters, Central
Java contributed significantly to the victory of Joko
Widodo. Similarly, the victory of Joko Widodo in
East Java was more than enough to offset his lose
in West Sumatera.
As seen from Figure 5, there is positive correlation
between the average of democracy index and the
share of Jokowi’s voters over Prabowo. This indicates that in province with higher level of democracy
index, voters that choose Jokowi relatively higher
than to Prabowo. However, we cannot conclude
that it is causation. However, as seen from Figure 6,
only six provinces that showed increasing democracy index between 2009 and 2013, while other
provinces indicated a negative sign. Provinces that
showed improvement in democracy index were DI
Yogyakarta, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Bali,
East Nusa Tenggara, Banten, and Bangka Belitung.
Thus Jokowi won in all the provinces that showed
increasing index in democracy (except in Banten).
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Table 5: Statistic Descriptive*
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Variable
Jokowi won
PDRB (in billion Rp)
Education
Internet access
Formal job
Middle-expenditure group
Upper-expenditure group

Mean

Std. Dev

Min.

Max.

0.6619
4,645
22,597
13.07
32.22
36.95
43.26

0.473
11,4
41,745
9.47
17.1
2.04
4.12

0
35
25
0
0.09
27.20
28.20

1
117
334,993
61
76.8
44.06
58.90

Note: Please refer to appendix for data source and definition (Table 10)
Source: Author’s calculation from primary data

Table 6: Linear Correlation

Jokowi won
PDRB
Education
Internet access
Formal job
Middle-expenditure group
Upper-expenditure group

Jokowi won

PDRB

Education

1
-0.135
-0.141
-0.084
-0.094
-0.009
0.019

1
0.449
0.796
0.404
-0.072
0.323

1
0.512
0.648
-0.130
0.227

Internet
access

1
0.519
-0.049
0.271

Formal job

1
-0.131
0.171

Middleexpenditure

Upperexpenditure

1
-0.805

1

Source: Author’s calculation from primary data

Figure 4: Presidential Election Result by Province and Foreign Pool
Source: Author’s calculation from primary data
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Then, we may also argue that the victory of Jokowi
is related to the coalition parties. We consider this
variable in the econometric analysis. We calculated
the number of sit in the DPR from each province.
Then we divided it according to the coalition both
from Jokowi and Prabowo. The Jokowi’s coalition
consist of PDI-P, Nasdem, PKB, and Hanura, while
the Prabowo’s coalition consist of Gerindra, PKS,
PPP, Demokrat, Golkar, and PAN. We calculated
the correlation between the Jokowi’s victory and the
share of parliament seat that pro to Jokowi’s coalition. The coefficient correlation is 0.165 (positive).
This indicates that in the province where Jokowi’s
coalition tend to have higher number of parliament
seat than Prabowo’s coalition, Jokowi has tendency
to win.

4.3. Empirical Results
As seen from Table 7, we developed 8 models to
illustrate relationship between the victory of Jokowi
and representative group of middle class. All the
models confirm that education has negative sign
and it is statistically significant. This implies that the
probability of Jokowi to win in the district with relatively high number of people with higher educational
background is low. This implies that educated people is more likely to choose Prabowo as a president
holding others factor constant. In terms of internet
access, the result also showed that the higher share
of society in the district/city has internet access, is
less likely to choose Joko Widodo. Thus, in the district/city that relatively large number of people with
educational attainment and also in the district/city
with large portion of families have internet access,
it is less likely that Joko Widodo to be win.
The results also indicates that for the middle expenditure group (decile 5 to 8), we do not obtain strong
evidence to argue that Joko Widodo tended to win
in district/city with relatively large share of middle
expenditure group, even after we decomposed the
group (model 3). However, it seems that Jokowi
tend to win in the upper expenditure group (decile
9 to 10), and by decomposing the upper expenditure group, we obtain that the top decile (decile
10) is more likely to vote for Joko Widodo. Thus, it
seems that there is still lack in evidence to argue
that Joko Widodo tended to win vote among the
middle class (in terms of its characteristic and expenditure group), except at the highest expenditure

D EMOCRACY: A N A SSESSMENT...

level.
Then what variable that can explain the victory
of Joko Widodo. Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata
(2004), investigated the role of religious (the number of Muslims in a ditrict) to the number of votes of
the seven parties in a district in the 1999 elections.
Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004) argued that
there is exist of religious loyalties in the 1999 election. We found that during the presidential election,
religious issue has been used to attack other presidential candidate. Considering the massive black
campaign during the presidential election, we argue that a religious dimension become of the key
element and Joko Widodo went to Makkah for Umroh three days before the presidential election. This
indicates that ’religious expression’ is important for
Jokowi to overcome black campaign. To investigate
how important religious, we consider the share of
Muslim in each district/city as one of the explanatory variables. As seen from Table 8, Jokowi is less
likely to be win a district with larger share of Muslims. Our results supported the fact that most of
Muslim parties supported Prabowo except PKB.
As seen from Table 9, we do not obtain convincing
results to conclude that increasing the democracy
index, increase probability of Jokowi win the respective province. Similarly with Human Development
Index and share of Jokowi’s coalition parties in the
parliament, although the three variable have positive sign. Thus, there may be other factors can
explain better the victory of Jokowi based on the
provincial level data set.

5. Conclusion
In investigating the role of middle class and democracy during the 2014 presidential election, we found
that probability of Jokowi to win in the district with
relatively high number of educated person and good
access on internet tend to be lower than Prabowo.
However, our results indicates that province with
relatively high share of decile 9 and 10 (super rich)
is more likely to elect Jokowi. This indicates that
different level of middle classes spending have difference political preferences. Data showed that the
proportion of the top 20% upper expenditure was
stable, especially in urban area between 2011 and
2014 (see Table 3). This group of expenditure has
higher preference on democratic polity.
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Figure 5: Average Index of Democracy and Jokowi’s Victory (Provincial Data, 2009–2013)
Source: Author’s calculation from primary data

Figure 6: Change in Index of Democracy and Jokowi’s Victory (Provincial Data, 2009–2013)
Source: Author’s calculation from primary data
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Table 7: Regression Results I (Middle Class and Victory of Jokowi)

Education

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

-0.488
(0.189)*
0.0112
(0.0102)
-0.0255
(0.0177)
0.25
(0.167)
-

-0.518
(0.189)*
0.009
(0.010)
-0.0303
(0.018)***
0.282
(0.168)***
-

-0.525
(0.189)*
0.0113
(0.0102)
-0.0311
(0.018)***
0.267
(0.137)
-

-0.525
(0.189)*
0.011
(0.0103)
-0.0314
(0.018)***
0.276
(0.168)
-

-0.511
(0.189)*
0.01
(0.0103)
-0.0355
(0.0184)***
0.266
(0.169)
-

-

-

-0.522
(0.188)*
0.009
(0.010)
-0.035
(0.018)***
0.282
(0.167)
0.106
(0.091)
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.095
(0.047)**
-

Middle-exp.group share 5

-

-0.506
(0.19)*
0.0118
(0.0102)
-0.026
(0.0177)
0.251
(0.167)
-0.045
(0.049)
-

Middle-exp.group share 6

-

-

Middle-exp.group share 7

-

-

Middle-exp.group share 8

-

-

Upper-exp.group share (9-10)

-

-

-0.153
(0.372)
-0.105
(0.458)
-0.042
(0.381)
0.1458
(0.252)
-

Upper-exp.group share 9

-

-

-

0.048
(0.0262)***
-

Upper-exp.group share 10

-

-

-

-

497
0.0291

497
0.0305

497
0.0333

497
0.0347

Formal job
Internet access
PDRB
Middle-expenditure group (5-8)

Number of obs
Pseudo R2

0.085
(0.105)
0.045
(0.027)
497
0.0349

497
0.0369

0.616
(0.595)
-0.0004
(0.47)
-0.025
(0.388)
0.295
(0.336)
0.097
(0.202)
0.156
(0.088)***
497
0.0385

Note: Standard error in parentheses; *= significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%
Source: Author’s calculation from primary data

Table 8: Regression Results II (Religious and Victory of Jokowi)

Education
Formal job
Internet access
PDRB
Upper-exp.group share (9-10)
Middle-expenditure group (5-8)
Religion
Number of obs.
Pseudo R2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-0.346
(0.213)
0.0107
(0.0106)
-0.0277
(0.0192)
0.367
(0.184)**
0.0353
(0.0279)
-

-0.337
(0.212)
0.0112
(0.0107)
-0.0242
(0.0188)
0.3558
(0.184)***
-

-0.032
(0.005)*

-0.053
(0.053)
-0.032
(0.005)*

-0.347
(0.212)
0.0105
(0.0107)
-0.0283
(0.0195)
0.369
(0.185)**
0.043
(0.0537)
0.0171
(0.103)
-0.0319
(0.005)*

497
0.126

497
0.1256

497
0.1226

Note: Standard error in parentheses; *= significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
Note: *** significant at 10%
Source: Author’s calculation from primary data
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Table 9: Regression Result III (Democracy and Victory of Jokowi)
Independent variable

Parameter

Human Development Index (HDI)
Indonesia Democracy Index (IDI)
Share of Jokowi’s coalition in the parliament
Number of obs.
Pseudo R2

0.025
(0.096)
0.057
(0.061)
1.098
(1.471)
33
0.063

Note: Standard error in parentheses; *= significant at 1%;
Note: ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%
Source: Author’s calculation from primary data

Table 10: Appendix: Variables, Description and Data Source
No

Variables

Description and source

1

Result on presidential election

2

Regional Domestic Product (PDRB) at district/city level

3

Internet access

4

Education

5

Formal job

6

Middle-expenditure group

7

Upper-expenditure group

We collected data from Kawal Pemilu ( www.kawalpemilu.org) at
district/city level. Then we change the data into 0 and 1 format,
that 0 represents Jokowi lose (Prabowo won) and 1 represent
Jokowi won (Prabowo lose).
We collected data from BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik). We used
PDRB without oil and gas (at constant price 2000).
We collected data from Sensus 2010 (Up dated 4 May 2012). It
represents the share of household (C1) – landed house and C2apartment that has internet access in the last three month. This
include the access through personal computer (PC) and mobile
phone.
We collected data from Sensus 2010 (Up dated 4 May 2012). This
indicates the number of people with higher degree of education (it
starts from Diploma to Doctoral degree)
We collected data from Sensus 2010. It represent the share of
people who obtain monthly or fix income.
Group of household with expenditure above 40 decile and below
80 decile. We used data from SUSENAS 2012.
Group of household with expenditure above 80 decile. We used
data from SUSENAS 2012.

Source: Author’s calculation from primary data

Further, we found that Jokowi was less likely to
win in the district with relatively high percentage
of Muslim. At the provincial level, we also did not
obtain convincing results to argue that provinces
with relatively high index of democracy will lead to
higher probability Jokowi to be the winner. However, Jokowi won in four out of five provinces that
indicated an increase in democracy index between
2009 and 2013. Similarly, the party’s coalition, are
less likely to supported Jokowi’s victory.
Thus by connecting the three elements (middle
class, democracy, and presidential election), this
paper comes with three main implications. First, a
fragile middle class would be a barrier to move from
formal democracy orientation to substantial democracy. Because the middle class is vulnerable to the

economic shocks, government needs to develop
more inclusive growth strategy and expanding social security programs. Second , low level of turnout
voters bring huge opportunity cost not only in terms
of money inefficiency, but also gaining supports
to swift transition for more substantive democracy.
This implies that parties not only need to develop
ideology platform, but also to promote cadres based
on meritocracy system. Third , personality politics
is still important in Indonesian presidential race.
Charismatic and religious leaders may have better
chance to be a president.
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